Sino-African encounters in Ghana and Nigeria: from conflict to conviviality and mutual benefit by Lampert, Ben & Mohan, Giles
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Sino-African encounters in Ghana and Nigeria: from
conflict to conviviality and mutual benefit
Journal Item
How to cite:
Lampert, Ben and Mohan, Giles (2014). Sino-African encounters in Ghana and Nigeria: from conflict to
conviviality and mutual benefit. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 43(1) pp. 9–39.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2014 The Authors
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs 
China aktuell 
 
 
 
Understanding Chinese–African Interactions in Africa 
Lampert, Ben, and Giles Mohan (2014), Sino-African Encounters in Ghana and 
Nigeria: From Conflict to Conviviality and Mutual Benefit, in: Journal of Current 
Chinese Affairs, 43, 1, 9–39. 
ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print) 
 
The online version of this article and the other articles can be found at: 
<www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> 
 
Published by 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies  
in cooperation with the National Institute of Chinese Studies, White Rose East Asia 
Centre at the Universities of Leeds and Sheffield and Hamburg University Press. 
 
The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.   
 
To subscribe to the print edition: <ias@giga-hamburg.de> 
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> 
 
The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is part of the GIGA Journal Family which includes: 
● ●Africa Spectrum  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs  Journal of Current Southeast 
● ●Asian Affairs  Journal of Politics in Latin America  <www.giga-journal-family.org> 
 
 
 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2014:  939 
Sino-African Encounters in Ghana and 
Nigeria: From Conflict to Conviviality and 
Mutual Benefit 
Ben LAMPERT and Giles MOHAN 
Abstract: China’s renewed engagement with Africa is often framed as 
a form of imperialism, with the growing number of Chinese migrants 
on the continent seen as an exploitative presence. Such claims have 
generally been based on little evidence, and where more detailed em-
pirical studies have emerged, they tend to emphasise the tensions and 
conflicts that have arisen. Our research on Chinese migrants in Ghana 
and Nigeria suggests that while there are concerns about Chinese 
competition in the informal retail sector and the treatment of local 
labour in Chinese enterprises, narratives of apparent tension and con-
flict are often much more nuanced than is generally recognised. Fur-
thermore, more convivial and cooperative relations have also emerged 
and these have facilitated important opportunities for Africans to bene-
fit from the Chinese presence. However, while the presence of Chinese 
migrants in African socio-economic life can be more integrated and 
mutually beneficial than is often assumed, the ability of African actors 
to benefit from this presence is highly uneven, placing the politics of 
class at the centre of any understanding of Sino-African encounters.  
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Moving beyond Ethnicity in Understanding
Everyday Sino-African Encounters 
The migration and development literature largely assumes a “South”-
to-“North” trajectory, but much migration is “South–South” (Hujo 
and Piper 2007; Ratha and Shaw 2007), even if these geographical 
categories are problematic (Bakewell 2009). The Chinese are part of a 
small but significant migration flow to Africa. However, we lack fine-
grained analysis of how these migrants and the African societies they 
reside in interact, and how this affects development. New studies on 
Chinese migrants and their relationships with Africans, as well as on 
African migrants in China, are emerging (e.g. Bodomo 2010; Giese 
and Thiel 2012; Haugen 2012) which confirm a level of cultural dis-
sonance that produces tensions, but not ones that necessarily result in 
conflict. This paper1 makes similar observations, though our analysis 
takes a political economy perspective that focuses on the intersec-
tions between globalisation and class rather than culture per se. We are 
not discounting cultural identity but feel it is overdetermined in the 
accounts of “China” in “Africa”. By focusing on the globalisation of 
China and Africa, processes of capital accumulation, and the embed-
ded nature of local politics, we get a more mixed picture of why and 
how Chinese and Africans engage. Note that these categories are 
pluralised since we argue that different nationally based classes stra-
tegically align at certain moments, which makes for quite convivial 
social relations as opposed to only the antagonistic, culturally deter-
mined ones. Indeed, we would argue that racial and cultural othering 
have come to stand in for class conflict, which has implications for 
the politics of China in Africa and the possibilities for mutual devel-
opment. 
This paper is based on ethnographic fieldwork with Chinese mi-
grants in Ghana and Nigeria, as well as with Ghanaians and Nigerians 
connected to or affected by their presence. The research was con-
ducted between July 2010 and September 2011 and involved partici-
pant observation, a local attitude survey and semi-structured inter-
views with 102 Chinese migrants and 61 Ghanaians and Nigerians. 
1 The research on which this article is based was funded by the UK Economic 
and Social Research Council (RES 062-23-1893). The authors are grateful to 
two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this 
article. 
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While informed by our wider data set, this paper draws principally on 
participant observation and interviews with Ghanaian and Nigerian 
respondents and explores their perspectives on, and relations with, 
Chinese migrants. All respondents and associated companies have 
been anonymised, and where names have been used, these are pseu-
donyms.  
The paper unfolds as follows. We frame the analysis using Castles’ 
(2009, 2010) social transformation framework, which situates global 
migration as a “normal” part of development, although Castles im-
plicitly defines such migration flows as South-to-North rather than 
South-to-South. The framework is used to set up two contrasting 
trends, which we analyse using our data on Chinese migrants in Gha-
na and Nigeria. The first trend is the development of tension and 
conflict around two issues: the activities of Chinese traders, and the 
treatment of local workers in Chinese enterprises. The second trend 
is the apparent opposite: the development of convivial social relations 
between Chinese migrants and some Africans. Here, we highlight 
how these convivial encounters are a channel through which African 
actors can leverage significant benefits from the Chinese presence. 
However, we emphasise that these encounters are shaped by class 
dynamics, meaning that the ability of African actors to derive benefits 
from them is highly uneven. 
Theoretical Framework 
Drawing on the recent work of Castles, our intention is to develop a 
political economy of social relations that is attentive to local agency. 
Existing studies of China–Africa relations tend to focus on state-bas-
ed elites and all but ignore African agency (see Mohan and Lampert 
2013). Where more “everyday”, micro-level relations are considered, 
the Chinese presence in Africa is often presented as exploitative with 
an emphasis on labour abuses, tensions and the perception of mutual 
threat between Chinese and Africans (e.g. Human Rights Watch 
2011; McNamee et al. 2012). Giese and Thiel (2012) examine cross-
cultural employment relations in the particular context of Chinese 
trading companies in Accra, necessarily focusing on the Chinese em-
ployer–African employee relationship, which has a particular class 
dynamic built into it. They argue that expectations on both sides are 
not always met, causing tensions to arise, though these are rarely 
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explosive. Similar empirical arguments about the lack of trust appear 
in Haugen and Carling (2005) (see also Hsu 2007; Dobler 2008). 
What these studies show is that despite a framing of protagonists in 
national and cultural terms, it is the interplay of class and other identi-
ties that shapes the tensions. As such, they caution us against static 
readings of intercultural relations and urge us to focus on the inter-
section of multiple class positions and embodied axes of identity.  
To unpack these linkages between globalisation, class and identi-
ty, Lee (2009) frames the tensions between Chinese and Africans in 
terms of political economy. Her perspective centres on neoliberalism 
and the attendant casualisation of labour and subordination of trade 
unions rather than on the fundamental differences in the worldviews 
of “the Chinese” or “Africans”. We concur that political economy is 
vital and that we should avoid overly culturalist explanations (see 
Meagher 2012; Dirlik 1997). Hints of this interplay between class and 
an Orientalist cultural gaze can be found in Haugen and Carling 
(2005), where respondents talk about “yellow” and “black” people 
sharing a position of doing “dirty work”, out of which a certain af-
finity arises. There are complex class, geopolitical and racial dynamics 
at play in these expressions of affinity (Jacques 2009).  
Towards an Integrative Framework 
In seeking to analyse Chinese migrants in Africa in relational and 
developmental terms, we use Castles’ (2009, 2010) analysis of migra-
tion as social transformation. The attractiveness of this framework is 
that it breaks from the methodological nationalism that pervades 
much of the work on migration, and in contrast to the “sedentarist 
bias” it treats migration as normal and constitutive of social change 
rather than as an aberration which needs to be “managed” for “proper” 
development to take place. Castles’ understanding of social transfor-
mation is taken from Polanyi, who argued that economic relations are 
embedded in society and that during the transition to capitalism eco-
nomic relations become disembedded from social relations, which 
requires purposive action to contain these contradictions (see Hart 
2001). 
Under neoliberal globalisation, the deepening of capitalist rela-
tions intensifies the processes of transformation across space, one of 
which – according to Castles – is “South”-to-“North” migration. For 
African societies, globalisation is a long-standing reality and, as Fer-
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guson (2006) argues, has re-emphasised Africa’s position in the global 
economy as a supplier of raw materials. It is also a process that en-
trenches the power of elites who can control access to these re-
sources (see Carmody 2011). This broad framing of global restructur-
ing is important but misses two crucial elements: First, the rise of 
China is now a major part of the globalisation story (Henderson 
2008), which adds new actors to the African resource-access land-
scape without necessarily changing the terms on which this occurs 
(Tull 2006). The result is that migration flows are not simply South-
to-North, but South-to-South (see Mohan 2013). Second, while glob-
alisation is seen to concern large transnational corporations, inter-
state negotiations and multilateral institutions, it also affects small 
firms and individual migrants who may operate outside of any obvi-
ous state-based agendas (see Gu 2009; Alden 2007). Hence, there are 
different modes and scales over which globalisation occurs. This is 
echoed in Castles’ comment that Polanyian approaches to transfor-
mation are essentially top-down and “fail to analyse the local effects 
of global economic and political forces” (Castles 2009: 16). That said, 
these private Chinese firms are capitalist, so we have to acknowledge 
the accumulation imperative in any relationship these firms have with 
African actors.  
From here, Castles (2010) argues for a multi-scaled analysis that 
connects examinations at global, national and local levels (see also 
Mung 2008). Such a comprehensive analysis is sensitive not only to 
historical conditioning but also to the local context, the latter includ-
ing political institutions and human agency. In our analysis of Chinese 
migrants in West Africa, we examine both agency and resistance (see 
Mohan and Lampert 2013), which helps us understand the tensions 
and conviviality we see. The value of such a global–local focus helps 
us move beyond fixed notions of identity and to explore the ways in 
which interaction and mixing occur. However, while the idea of con-
vivial social relations has been posited by Gilroy (2004) as a real and 
useful antidote to a postcolonial “melancholia” in the UK, it remains 
an empirically lifeless concept (Bonnett 2010). Here we use the an-
thropological account of Overing and Passes (2000), which sees con-
viviality as the “affective side” of sociality. Regarding work, this affec-
tive side pertains to  
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the congenial, convivial relations of work [that] are essential to a 
sociality that allows for very little coercive force, and no discord, 
with respect to the matter of work (Overing and Passes 2000: 16). 
However, Overing and Passes are not peddling some pristine utopia – 
convivial sociality carries within it the threat of destruction of social 
unity. Methodologically, this points us to an “ethnography of the 
ordinary” (Overing and Passes 2000: 8). 
Despite this call for examining the non-coercive side of social re-
lations, our earlier observations suggested that in order to deepen our 
understanding of both tensions and convivial relations we need to 
examine class as a process. In this analysis, we break away from fixed 
and homogenising understandings of classes and tease out the inter-
play of structured economic relationships with other axes of social 
identity (Gibson-Graham 2006: 11). We are distancing ourselves from 
the Weberian-inspired literature on Chinese firms that tends to posit 
cultural closure and to essentialise “groups” (Meagher 2012; Green-
halgh 1994). These Weberian accounts emphasise closed communi-
ties and “ethnic” economies built around guanxi (??). However, 
Meagher (2012) argues that when Chinese networks “touch ground” 
in Africa they become more like African networks, where forms of 
semi-legal brokerage by intermediaries enable these enterprises to 
operate. Here she uses Brautigam’s (2003) work on “flying geese 
industrialisation”, whereby the Chinese presence can kick-start local 
economic development. By contrast, when Meagher uses Hart’s 
(1996) work on South Africa and Taiwan, we get a different reading 
and an analysis closer to Lee’s (2009) political economy of casualisa-
tion and undercutting, which is anything but developmental. This 
points to a contextual understanding of the relationship between 
class, cultural capital and ethnicity (Ellis 2011) and their connection 
to development impacts.  
Tension and Conflict I: Chinese Traders vs.  
African Traders and Manufacturers 
It has been well documented that the growing Chinese presence in 
Africa has generated considerable public debate and even protest. As 
in a number of other African countries (see, for example, Dittgen 
2010; Dobler 2008; McNamee et al. 2012; Scheld 2010), one of the 
most contentious issues related to the Chinese presence in Ghana and 
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Nigeria has been the arrival since the early 2000s of significant num-
bers of Chinese traders and their importation of large quantities of 
“cheap” Chinese consumer goods. This is often seen to present a 
direct challenge to locals operating in the informal retail sector and to 
undermine local manufacturing. In Ghana, some of the most promi-
nent agitation has been led by the Ghana Union of Traders Associa-
tion (GUTA) and has centred on the main markets of central Accra.  
Shops run by Chinese traders started to become a notable fea-
ture of central Accra in the early 2000s, especially in the vicinity of a 
large retail complex in Rawlings Park, which was formally re-named 
the “Ghana Chinese Commodities Wholesale Town” around 2004 
and is popularly known as “China Town”, even though only a few 
Chinese shops remain in the complex. By late 2005, GUTA began 
expressing its dissatisfaction with the “unrestrained invasion” of 
“foreigners” into the retail sector and suggested that a “massive 
demonstration” would be held in Accra if the government failed to 
enforce the 1994 Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act 
(Takyi-Boadu 2005). This legislation explicitly reserves for Ghanaians 
the business of retailing in public markets and stipulates that any 
form of foreign-owned trading enterprise must make a minimum 
investment of 300,000 USD and employ at least ten local staff. Al-
though the government was aware of the growing disquiet and had 
already undertaken to review the legislation (GNA 2005), its response 
failed to satisfy GUTA. In late 2007, the association organised a day 
of action involving the closure of shops and a march which culminat-
ed in a mass rally in Opera Square, bringing the capital’s commercial 
heart to a standstill (GNA 2007a, 2007b; Klutse and Ennin 2007). 
The government entered into discussions with GUTA and in mid-
2009 agreed to revise the GIPC Act and form a multi-agency task 
force to more effectively enforce the legislation (Nonor 2009). 
However, impact of the task force was limited. While the man-
ager of the “China Town” complex reports that increasing attention 
from immigration and revenue officials played a role in encouraging 
most of the Chinese shops to leave the complex, many simply relo-
cated to nearby streets where, dispersed among African businesses, 
they apparently felt less prone to targeting by the authorities (An-
onymous 1 2011). Indeed, by 2011, some of the side roads and small-
er complexes near “China Town” were almost completely dominated 
by Chinese shops, many selling shoes with others specialising in lug-
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gage, household furnishings, electrical fittings, plumbing equipment 
and fishing nets.  
GUTA remains highly agitated, bemoaning that while the Chi-
nese shops claim to engage only in wholesale business, they continue 
to retail despite being unlikely to have met the legal requirements of 
having made an initial investment of 300,000 USD and employing a 
minimum of ten local workers (Anonymous 2 2011). Compounding 
this, GUTA argues, Chinese traders gain unfair advantages through a 
range of underhand practices such as selling cheaper “imitation” 
goods, underreporting imports and sales to reduce tariffs and taxes, 
avoiding making social security payments for the local staff they em-
ploy, and using their greater access to credit in order to inflate shop 
rents and force locals out of business. The GIPC task force has failed 
to rectify the situation, GUTA complains, because there is a “tenden-
cy” for officials to take payments from the Chinese shops in return 
for not enforcing the regulations (Anonymous 2 2011). While the 
current Minister for Trade and Industry has publicly sympathised 
with GUTA’s concerns (GNA 2010), officials of the association warn 
that if decisive action is not taken soon, they may no longer be able 
to contain the frustration of their members. “If nothing is done about 
it”, the GUTA General Secretary contends, “[…] every human en-
durance has its limit, so when it reaches the peak, definitely there will 
be eruption”. Indeed, he goes on to report that a branch of GUTA 
recently brought a resolution threatening direct action against Chi-
nese traders. “If nothing is done about it”, the branch apparently 
determined, “perhaps we will come and flush them out ourselves”. 
In Nigeria, strong resistance against the activities of Chinese 
traders has also been excited by the emergence of a prominent “Chi-
na Town” shopping complex. Nigeria’s first “China Town” had ori-
ginally been established in 1999 in the upmarket Lagos district of 
Ikoyi but in 2002 it began the process of relocating to a larger site, in 
Ojota (Anonymous 3 2010). By this time, “China Town” had become 
a target for prominent Nigerian manufacturers and the Manufacturers 
Association of Nigeria (MAN), which argued that the complex was a 
channel for the influx of cheap and often substandard Chinese con-
sumer goods that was undermining local producers, particularly in the 
textile industry (Anonymous 3 2010; Anonymous 4 2011; see also 
Akinrinade and Ogen 2008; Ogidan 2004). Responding to these calls 
from the manufacturing lobby, the federal government added a new 
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raft of goods, including textiles, to its import prohibition list, and in 
late 2005, just nine months after the new “China Town” was officially 
commissioned, officers of the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) raided 
the complex, seized contraband goods and sealed the premises (Oba-
sola 2006). “The activities of foreigners should not be allowed to 
destroy the industrial base of this country”, declared the head of the 
NCS (quoted in Mbachu 2006: 81). MAN promptly commended the 
government for taking action and called for those involved in selling 
prohibited goods to be prosecuted and for “China Town” to be 
closed permanently (Daily Independent 2006; Okere 2006).  
While no prosecutions appear to have been made and the com-
plex was allowed to reopen three months later (Obasola 2006), the 
raid and temporary closure severely disrupted “China Town”, with 
most of the Chinese traders losing large amounts of stock and many 
seeking alternative opportunities elsewhere in Nigeria and beyond 
(Anonymous 3 2010). Those who remained in the Lagos “China 
Town” and continued to import contraband goods, particularly tex-
tiles, found it increasingly expensive to “settle” officials and even 
then often had their shipments confiscated. Business never recovered 
to the previous levels, and at the time of research almost half of the 
complex’s shops were unoccupied. For its part, MAN certainly ap-
pears to be less concerned about the specific case of “China Town” 
and more inclined to focus its efforts on the wider problem of regu-
lating the importation of counterfeit and substandard Chinese goods 
(Anonymous 4 2011). The activities of Chinese traders have nonethe-
less continued to be a cause of local agitation, particularly in Kano’s 
textile market. Here, complaints about a growing Chinese presence in 
direct retailing recently prompted the arrest of 45 Chinese traders by 
the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the local NIS chief promising 
that they would be deported and declaring that “economic scaven-
gers” would not be allowed in Nigeria (BBC 2012). 
Tension and Conflict II: Chinese Bosses vs.  
African Workers 
Alongside the activities of Chinese migrant traders, a second key issue 
in debates about the growing Chinese presence in Africa has been the 
employment of locals in Chinese enterprises. Much has been made of 
the apparent tendency of Chinese companies in Africa to import 
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most of their labour from China and thereby create relatively few 
opportunities for local employment (see, for example, Bergesen 
2008). However, while there have been some Chinese state-backed 
projects in Ghana and Nigeria where a large proportion of the labour 
has been Chinese, this has not emerged as the major area of concern 
around employment. Indeed, with Chinese enterprises in the two 
countries often employing largely African workforces, the treatment 
of local workers has become the overriding issue.  
As has been highlighted elsewhere in Africa (see, for example, 
Baah and Jauch 2009; Brooks 2010; Lee 2009), there are widespread 
complaints about low pay and poor conditions in Chinese companies 
and a growing sense in some quarters that “the Chinese” are particu-
larly bad employers. GUTA certainly echoes such accusations in its 
case against Chinese traders operating in Accra’s markets. An official 
of the association argues,  
they go in for cheap labour, people who do not even know let 
alone understand their rights, then they will take them as tempo-
rary [workers], underpay them, then they discard them after some-
time and then recruit another (Anonymous 2 2011).  
A Ghanaian who has for several years helped some of these Chinese 
traders with their accounts and tax returns, and who appears to have 
no particular grudge against them, concurs, describing the wages they 
pay their local shop staff as “very woeful” (Anonymous 5 2011). 
“They don’t pay much at all”, he contends,  
aside that, he will not pay any social security, he will just not pay 
anything for you. They can also just decide to just let you go any-
time he feels he doesn’t want your services (Anonymous 5 2011).  
Having experienced such conditions, a local worker in a Chinese 
shop in Accra complained that his salary of around 80 GHS a month 
barely covers his basic living expenses (Anonymous 6 2011). He con-
tends that his employers meet their legal obligation to pay his social 
security contributions only because he asked them to do so, and he is 
particularly angry that they deduct his pay when he is unable to attend 
work due to illness. For him, such treatment is symptomatic of a 
general lack of basic respect and compassion on the part of Chinese 
bosses: “They don’t care about black [people]”, he laments bitterly, 
“they don’t care about you the worker, he doesn’t even respect you”. 
This illustrates not only how the treatment of local workers in Chi-
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nese enterprises can generate anger and resentment but also how this 
can be expressed in racialised ways, instigating a process of othering 
through which distinct and potentially divisive identity boundaries are 
constructed (cf. Giese and Thiel 2012). As the Ghanaian worker con-
tinues,  
I have worked with these people, I know how they are […]. So as 
for me I look at them and laugh. I say, “You people, you are very 
bad people.” […] These Chinese people, […], I don’t like them 
(Anonymous 6 2011). 
And as in the case of GUTA’s agitation against Chinese traders, there 
is an implicit threat of violence contained only by the self-ascribed 
restraint of Ghanaians: “You can see a Chinese man with the money, 
you can easily beat him and take the money, but we don’t do that.” 
In Nigeria, controversy about labour conditions in Chinese en-
terprises has been generated in the manufacturing sector, where a 
number of long-established Hong Kong Chinese companies have not 
only become key players but also developed a reputation for poor 
industrial relations (Mthembu-Salter 2009; Obiorah 2007; Oyeranti, 
Babatunde, and Ogunkola 2011; Taylor 2007; Utomi 2008). The issue 
of low pay is again prominent, a MAN official claiming, “In fact, they 
enslave workers, their pay is very, very poor” (Anonymous 4 2011). 
This has led to incidents of industrial unrest, and this respondent 
recalls that workers at one well-known Hong Kong Chinese factory 
in Lagos once became so aggrieved at their low pay that they demon-
strated and “wanted to burn the whole place”. It is also reported that 
this company has upset its workers and the Nigeria Labour Congress 
(NLC) for apparently employing many on a casual basis, even after 
years of service in some cases (Babalola and Lawal 2002; Ibharuneafe 
2002; Oyeranti, Babatunde, and Ogunkola 2011). 
Such tensions around pay and casualisation have been com-
pounded by the reported anti-union practices of some Chinese manu-
facturing companies in Nigeria. For example, when the National 
Union of Chemical, Footwear, Rubber, Leather and Non-Metallic 
Products Employees (NUCFRLNMPE) called for improvements in 
workers’ conditions at a factory in Kano belonging to one of the two 
largest Hong Kong Chinese industrial conglomerates based in Nige-
ria, the company reportedly responded by intimidating union mem-
bers and temporarily shutting down the factory (Ahiuma-Young 
2009; Atomre et al. 2009; The Nation 2008). A senior NUCFRLNMPE 
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official in Kano laments that none of the company’s factories in the 
city currently has a branch of the union and that any worker who 
attempts to form one is promptly sacked (Anonymous 7 2011). Con-
sequently, he claims that the company continues to coerce excessive 
hours from its workers while paying salaries that can be less than half 
the negotiated industry-wide minimum monthly wage of 13,400 NGN. 
“This is a document, it’s a law”, he insists, “[...] but the Chinese man 
will tell you, ‘This law, you must review it.’” He complains,  
You can start negotiation from morning to night with the Chinese 
man, you will never achieve one single thing. [...] The difficult em-
ployer is the Chinese man. 
Destabilising the Divide: Nuancing Accounts of 
Tension and Conflict in Sino-African Encounters 
The activities of Chinese traders and the treatment of local workers in 
Chinese enterprises have clearly caused significant tensions and pro-
duced some negative racialised generalisations about, and even im-
plicit threats of violence against, “the Chinese”. However, we found 
that this is far from the complete picture – responses to the expanded 
Chinese presence in Ghana and Nigeria are more complex than this. 
Even those who feel they have been negatively affected often empha-
sise that the Chinese presence is not the sole cause of their problems 
and do not necessarily engage in specifically “anti-Chinese” agitation. 
In many cases, other foreign actors or even fellow locals are seen to 
be equally or even more responsible, and general issues of local gov-
ernance and regulation are consistently highlighted as the most press-
ing concerns. Indeed, rather than Chinese migrants or foreigners per 
se, it is overwhelmingly the state that is the target of resentment (see 
also Bourdarias 2010). Furthermore, negative reactions to the Chinese 
presence are often qualified and even countered by those who direct-
ly benefit from Chinese activities or believe these activities have posi-
tive social and economic outcomes.  
These more complex responses can be seen in relation to the ac-
tivities of Chinese traders and the treatment of local workers in Chi-
nese enterprises. GUTA’s agitation against Chinese traders in central 
Accra and beyond is part of a wider agitation against foreign traders 
in general. At GUTA’s 2007 protest rally against “the invasion of the 
retail trade by foreigners”, it was not only Chinese traders who were 
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pinpointed but also traders from India, Nigeria and Turkey (GNA 
2007a). And while Chinese traders are widely considered to be prom-
inent among these groups and have therefore attracted particular 
attention, it is Nigerian traders that are often seen to be the greatest 
cause for concern. Nigerian shops certainly appear to have been par-
ticularly affected by GIPC clampdowns on foreign traders, prompting 
vocal complaints from Nigerian traders, politicians and officials (see, 
for example, Ameyaw 2007; Ezugwu 2012). Indeed, the situation 
appears to have become even more politicised than the issue of Chi-
nese traders, with reports of GUTA members directly harassing Ni-
gerian traders, and reprisals against Ghanaian traders in Nigeria also 
reported (Ameyaw 2007). As one Ghanaian businessman comment-
ed, it is an issue that has been “threatening the relationship between 
Ghana and Nigeria” (Anonymous 8 2011). 
Furthermore, it is widely recognised even among those who have 
expressed concern about the influx of “cheap” Chinese products that 
it is often local rather than Chinese traders who are primarily respon-
sible (see also Axelsson 2012; Axelsson and Sylvanus 2010; Haugen 
2011; Marfaing and Thiel 2011). For example, the CEO of one of 
Ghana’s leading indigenous industries has, in his own words, “been 
making a lot of noise” about cheap, low-quality imports from China 
undermining his business, but asserts: 
China is actually not exporting into Ghana per se. Yeah, they make 
it available, [but] it’s Ghanaians and Nigerians that go to China to 
order what they want to buy. They go, they see the dregs, they see 
the trash, they see the Rolls Royces and what do they buy? Trash. 
That’s what’s coming here, it’s not the Chinese fault. [...W]hat the 
Ghanaian guys are doing, they are bringing these things in regard-
less of quality because they look at the money [i.e. cost]. [...S]o I 
don’t blame the Chinese [...], I blame the guys who go get that 
kind of stuff. [...] So it’s difficult to be anti-Chinese (Anonymous 9 
2011). 
Similarly, while MAN has led agitation against the “China Town” in 
Lagos, one of its officials is clear that it is local traders who are the 
main culprits in the importation of low-quality Chinese goods. He 
argues: 
All these products are being based by specification, it’s what the 
importers went there to request that they are giving to them. 
[...B]ecause you see the poverty level has made our importers […] 
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look at what can be done at least to make people live average be-
cause sometimes when you bring in standard products with high 
price, the sales will be very poor [...], [so] then you will try to bring 
down the cost (Anonymous 4 2011).  
This realisation means that MAN is focusing its attention on local 
traders, joining with government in “campaigning to change the orien-
tation of Nigerians who go [to China] to make specification for low-
er-quality products” (Anonymous 4 2011).  
What is more, some local actors see the expanded presence of 
Chinese traders as having positive impacts and are prepared to defend 
their activities to varying degrees. There is considerable sympathy for 
the argument that the increased entry of Chinese traders has served 
to lower the price local consumers have to pay for Chinese goods, 
and that this has a wide-reaching social benefit (see also Carling and 
Haugen 2008). For example, while a member of staff at the Kano 
Chamber of Commerce would prefer Chinese entrepreneurs to invest 
in the Nigerian textile industry, she nonetheless contends: 
Even in the textile importation of clothes, I don’t see much wrong 
because they have been able to clothe almost everybody, anybody 
can afford to get to them according to his capacity. We’ve had 
Vlisco brand from pre-independence up to now, not everyone can 
afford it. But the Chinese have come in and within a few years 
they’ve managed to clothe everybody (Anonymous 10 2011). 
A Ghanaian member of the Ghana–China Friendship Association, 
who is concerned more with promoting Ghanaian products in China 
than with defending the Chinese in Ghana, agrees that Chinese trad-
ers have benefitted local consumers by reducing the cost of Chinese 
goods. He argues that those making “big noise about the Chinese 
taking over the economy” are Ghanaian importers who previously 
enjoyed excessive profits on Chinese goods (Anonymous 11 2011). 
“They are being edged out of the business because they short-
changed us”, he contends, “So the Chinese themselves have come to 
give us the proper prices, so that is why they are not happy.” Notably, 
the Ghana Central Shopkeepers Association, which is allied with 
GUTA, complains that local distributors, in the form of what are 
popularly known as “market women”, prefer to buy from Chinese 
traders and have even challenged GUTA’s campaign against the Chi-
nese presence in the market (Anonymous 2 2011). 
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Support from local distributors and consumers also seems to 
have played a role in the survival of the “China Town” in Lagos. For 
example, a Nigerian who has been closely involved with the man-
agement of the complex reports that it had become a popular source 
of goods for “market women” from across Lagos and beyond and 
that when it was closed down by the Nigeria Customs Service in 
2005, the city’s influential market women’s association called on the 
governor of Lagos State to see to its reopening (Anonymous 12 
2010). Such efforts clearly prevailed and the complex was soon re-
opened, albeit with the loss of much of its vibrancy. 
In addition to the support for Chinese traders from consumers 
and local distributors, government officials and some elements of the 
organised private sector often have a relatively relaxed attitude to-
wards the Chinese trading presence. This derives primarily from the 
sentiment that in a globalised age, international flows of goods, people 
and investment are inevitable and, if managed properly, ultimately 
desirable. For example, an official in Ghana’s Ministry of Trade and 
Industry explained, “The rise of China is a reality and we have to 
accept it. The Chinese will come whether we like it or not” (Anonym-
ous 13 2011). The key is, he argued, to be proactive and shape the 
nature of the “cooperation”. This would, he claimed, “remove some 
of the trivial problems that have come to be associated with the Chi-
nese, like people saying they are doing retail trade”. Tellingly, he went 
on to argue that “we live in a global world and there are no borders 
anymore” and pointed out that “there are lots of Ghanaians in China 
now”. The implication appeared to be that Ghanaians should recog-
nise such global realities and be more accepting of the Chinese trad-
ing presence, which he saw as an inevitable part of a wider set of 
relations that he, and the Ghanaian government as a whole, are work-
ing to build with China.  
Similarly, while a senior official at the Kano Chamber of Com-
merce believes that the entry of Chinese traders should be subject to 
some government regulation, he emphasises that such flows are in-
herent to the modern world and ultimately produce positive out-
comes. In making this argument, he appeals to a sense of global citi-
zenship as well as the economic benefits of international investment: 
In a globalised environment, [to] which we are all claiming to be-
long, it is very, very difficult to say the Chinese should pack off 
and go. Because the Chinese are in India, they are in America, they 
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are in other Western European countries. [...] So definitely, Chi-
nese people, you cannot just take them as intruders, so to say, or 
people that are not welcome. [...I]n economics there is nothing 
like stopping A, B, C, D from participating in a business. No! We 
are all universal citizens. [...] If you are bringing money from any 
country to come and invest in Nigeria, it is in the interest of the 
Nigerian economy. So if the Chinese people are bringing their 
money to invest in Nigeria, it is very, very good (Anonymous 10 
2011). 
Chinese entrepreneurial investment is especially welcomed in the 
manufacturing sector, as this is seen to have the potential to make a 
significant contribution to local development. Stressing Kano’s long 
history of being a “cosmopolitan city” that welcomes “all people to 
come and do business”, a senior official at the Kano State Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry, Cooperatives and Tourism explained that the 
state government “see[s] the recent influx of the Chinese as an op-
portunity, not a threat” and hopes that Chinese traders will, after 
familiarising themselves with the local market, “want to turn to manu- 
facturing the goods here” (Anonymous 14 2011). To this end, he 
argues, the state government has put in place a range of incentives.  
However, while there is widespread openness to Chinese entre-
preneurial investment in manufacturing, the reservations about the 
treatment of local workers in Chinese enterprises, especially factories, 
remain. Yet even these undeniably serious concerns are often ex-
pressed in ways that are much more nuanced and contextualised than 
is sometimes suggested in commentary on China–Africa relations. 
While it is widely believed that poor pay and conditions are a prob-
lem in many Chinese-owned factories, this problem is not necessarily 
seen to be unique to them. Indeed, it is often suggested that while 
Chinese factories may be among the worst offenders, similarly poor 
conditions are to be found in other foreign- and locally owned enter-
prises (see also Yan and Sautman 2013 for a similar argument in the 
case of Zambia’s mining sector). The problem, therefore, comes to 
be framed not so much as a particular issue with Chinese factories, 
but rather as a wider challenge on the national manufacturing scene.  
Exemplifying this, a senior official of the NLC in Lagos insists 
that the prevailing labour conditions in Chinese manufacturing com-
panies are little worse than those in other foreign-owned industrial 
enterprises in Nigeria:  
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Basically whether you talk about the Chinese, the Lebanese [or] 
the Indians, they have the same kind of business attitude. [...T]hey 
try to cut cost, that’s labour cost (Anonymous 15 2010). 
He makes it clear that the NLC and its affiliated unions have no par-
ticular animosity towards Chinese manufacturers. Indeed, when the 
NLC picketed a Hong Kong Chinese-owned factory in Lagos in 2002 
over its use of casual workers, this action was part of a wider cam-
paign against casualisation by local and multinational manufacturers 
in general (Ibharuneafe 2002; Onoshevwe 2003). Alongside the Chi-
nese company, other targets of the NLC’s agitation were Nigerian 
companies such as the Eleganza Group and well-known multination-
als like Cadbury’s, Dunlop, Guinness and Unilever (Ibharuneafe 
2002; Onoshevwe 2003). 
Furthermore, Chinese manufacturers in Nigeria attract respect 
and even praise for being among the most resilient manufacturers in 
the country and continuing to invest in what is widely regarded as an 
extremely challenging industrial environment. For example, the Di-
rector-General of MAN argues,  
[We] appreciate their investments in Nigeria; they are still very 
committed to investing, they have confidence in our economy no 
matter the situation, whether you have religious problem or Niger 
Delta problem or political problem, they believe they can still [in-
vest]. So as far as I am concerned, the Chinese have assisted also 
in developing Nigeria. [...] They have never wavered. (Anonymous 
4 2011) 
One of his colleagues estimates that Chinese industrialists are respon-
sible for at least 60 per cent of the investment that has been made in 
the country’s manufacturing sector (Anonymous 4 2011). The latter 
reports, “In all facets of industry we have Chinese dominating”, and 
provides the example of the steel industry where he points to five 
Chinese companies which are major players, including one which he 
believes to be the largest steel producer in West Africa.  
Given the high rate of unemployment in Nigeria, the substantial 
number of local jobs created by Chinese manufacturers is especially 
appreciated. For example, one of the two largest Hong Kong Chinese 
manufacturing conglomerates is noted by a number of Nigerian and 
Chinese respondents for employing approximately 7,000 locals in 
Kano, and some 20,000 Nigerians across the country. Significantly, 
such important contributions to employment have produced some 
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tolerance of the poor pay and conditions generally associated with 
Chinese manufacturers. Indeed, a senior official of the NUCFRLNMPE 
union in Kano, who is himself quick to praise Chinese manufacturers 
for creating employment, contends that even local workers tend to 
accept the conditions in Chinese factories for want of more lucrative 
alternatives. He reports: 
Because of lack of job around, the workers will say “Oh, sorry sir, 
if they can pay us as they are saying, okay, no problem, let’s take it 
like that. Half bread is better than none” (Anonymous 7 2011). 
Building Bridges: Towards Conviviality,  
Cooperation and Mutual Benefit 
Narratives of tension and conflict in Sino-African encounters are 
further disrupted by accounts that highlight more convivial and mu-
tually beneficial outcomes. At the most basic level, there is some 
recognition that not all Chinese bosses are bad employers, with some 
apparently offering their workers better pay, conditions and prospects 
than many of their Chinese and non-Chinese counterparts. For ex-
ample, even the Ghanaian assistant in a Chinese shop in Accra who 
feels he is badly treated by his current Chinese manager, and conse-
quently claims to dislike Chinese people in general, warmly recalls his 
previous Chinese manager at the shop with whom he experienced a 
much more cordial and benevolent relationship:  
He likes me, you know, I talk to him. [...] Crack some jokes, you 
know. [...] Oh, that man, I prefer him a lot [...]. Although he’s not 
having the money, he just tell you, “Just take this, OK, to survive” 
(Anonymous 6 2011).  
In the manufacturing sector, a report by officials of the NLC found 
labour relations that were “regarded as a model in the industry” in a 
well-known Chinese textile factory in Lagos State (Atomre et al. 2009: 
352). Similarly, the NUCFRLNMPE union representative in Kano 
highlights a Hong Kong Chinese-owned manufacturing group in the 
city as being open to the union and for “doing better” than most of 
the city’s industries to provide decent employment (Anonymous 7 
2011). The Chinese manager of this factory stressed that, despite the 
increasing costs of manufacturing in Nigeria, the owner likes to pay 
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good wages to his workers as it encourages commitment and hard 
work (Anonymous 16 2011).  
Furthermore, while skilled and managerial positions in Chinese 
enterprises tend to be dominated by Chinese staff, in many cases 
locals have been given the opportunity to attain at least some of these 
positions (see also Bourdarias 2010; Lee 2009; Yan and Sautman 
2010). Chinese bosses emphasise that this makes good business sense – 
not only does it reduce the cost of recruiting increasingly expensive 
expertise from China but local managerial and technical staff are also 
particularly helpful in understanding the local market, managing local 
workers and negotiating the demands of local officials. In this way, 
many Chinese bosses have come to rely on senior local staff, and 
enduring and often close Sino-African relationships have ensued. For 
example, in the Hong Kong Chinese manufacturing group in Kano 
noted for its decent conditions, the Chinese manager spoke admiring-
ly of the three Nigerian technicians who have worked with the com-
pany for over a decade since being recruited straight after graduating 
from a local university (Anonymous 16 2011). The manager was 
proud that the technicians had gradually taken over the responsibili-
ties of their older Chinese counterparts and risen to senior positions, 
including that of chief electrical engineer for the group. Similarly, in 
one of the Chinese factories in Tema, the manager is a Ghanaian who 
has become the owner’s closest and most trusted deputy, having 
worked for him since the company was founded some 30 years ago. 
He oversees the 58 local staff and three Chinese technicians at the 
factory and regards the Chinese owner as “a brother” who has helped 
him greatly over the years, especially by enabling him to educate his 
children and sending him to China for medical treatment (Anonym-
ous 17 2011). 
With local staff attaining more senior positions in Chinese enter-
prises, Ghanaians and Nigerians have come to know Chinese people 
not only as bosses but also as colleagues, creating opportunities for 
the development of some highly convivial relations. Golden Tele-
coms, one of the three major Chinese telecommunication companies 
that have entered the Nigerian market since the late 1990s, has expli-
citly pursued a strategy of recruiting a high proportion of local staff 
for the reasons outlined above. A former Nigerian staff member 
reports that there is a Nigerian-to-Chinese staff ratio of about 2:1 in 
Golden Telecoms’ Lagos office, with a good number of local staff in 
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middle management positions (Anonymous 18 2010). However, there 
are complaints that Chinese staff sometimes appear to be favoured 
and that, contrary to official policy, meetings are occasionally held 
largely in Chinese. Furthermore, there is some resentment that a free 
canteen is provided for the exclusive use of Chinese staff, a practice 
that one Nigerian staff member describes as “almost racist” (Ano-
nymous 19 2010). Nonetheless, the overall consensus among Nigeri-
an staff was that their working relationships with Chinese colleagues 
are generally good and often friendly. For example, another Nigerian 
staff member remarks that he has “made a lot of Chinese friends” at 
the company, adding,  
We all go for lunch, [they] take me to [a] Chinese restaurant for 
their food, I take them to [a] Nigerian restaurant, then they eat 
Nigerian food! (Anonymous 20 2010)  
Similarly, when we visited the Lagos headquarters of a Chinese com-
pany that sells quarry machinery in Nigeria, we found a smart open-
plan office staffed by what immediately appeared to be a very happy 
and close team of two Chinese and two Nigerians. We learnt that the 
four men all knew each other from China, the two Nigerians being 
among an increasing number of their compatriots who have studied 
and/ or worked there in recent years. The Nigerians had joined the 
company during their time in China, and early in 2009 one of them 
was sent with one of their Chinese colleagues to establish a sales of-
fice in Nigeria. The two pioneers worked closely together and formed 
a strong bond, the Chinese colleague remarking of his Nigerian coun-
terpart,  
We try our best to do our jobs, and everything I did, he know, and 
everything he did, I know. We help each other. [...] He is Nigerian 
and I am a Chinese, so most of the time I need his help! (Ano-
nymous 21 2010)  
The four men are all of a similar age, speak each other’s languages 
and have clearly become good friends. As one of the Nigerian staff 
member enthuses of his Chinese colleagues: 
You know, I love my Chinese. When they come in, two, three 
days they have mixed up with the society [...]. They find it so in-
teresting, you know, going around. Now like Robert, he doesn’t 
want to go back again, he is like stuck here! He doesn’t want to go 
back. [He says,] “Wow, Nigeria, I love it” and he’s even planning 
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[on] bringing his girlfriend around and he will have a kind of per-
manent residence here. They love it, they love it! (Anonymous 21 
2010) 
Beyond such opportunities to enjoy convivial, cross-cultural interac-
tions, working with Chinese companies can also provide Africans 
with the chance to develop their skills, advance their careers, and 
pursue new business opportunities. In the Lagos “China Town”, for 
example, one of the growing number of Nigerians who have rented 
shops in the complex reports that he has built his business interests 
on the back of contacts he has made while working for Chinese en-
terprises (Anonymous 24 2010). As an engineering student, Mr. Joseph 
had developed an interest in Chinese technology and upon graduation 
was keen to gain experience working with it. A relative who worked 
at a local Hong Kong Chinese-owned factory helped him to secure a 
job there and this enabled him not only to develop his professional 
skills and experience but also to become “friends” with some of his 
Chinese colleagues. One of these introduced him to a Chinese entre-
preneur who wanted to begin trading in Nigeria with a view to estab-
lishing a manufacturing business. Mr. Joseph helped him identify a 
market niche and then left the factory to work as the manager of the 
new enterprise, which was based in “China Town”. After a few years, 
the Chinese entrepreneur decided that local conditions were not con-
ducive to establishing a factory and returned to China. But through 
this entrepreneur and the “China Town” complex, Mr. Joseph had 
further developed his network of Chinese contacts in both Nigeria 
and China and was able to take advantage of this to establish his own 
business importing Chinese goods. His contacts in China help him to 
identify suppliers and assist him when he visits, and his Chinese 
“friends” in “China Town” provide interpretation services if there are 
any communication difficulties when he makes telephone calls to 
China. Today, Mr. Joseph has one of the largest and most popular 
shops in “China Town” and is also utilising his network to pursue his 
long-standing ambition to mine minerals in southeast Nigeria for 
export to China, his contacts having introduced him to Chinese in-
vestors who are interested in supporting the project.  
Similarly, working for Golden Telecoms has enabled local staff 
to launch careers in Nigeria’s rapidly growing telecoms industry and 
wider corporate sector. The intensive, often hands-on training and 
rapid early-career promotion it offers are seen by current and former 
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Nigerian staff to provide the skills and experience necessary to secure 
better-paid jobs with the company’s American and European com-
petitors and other “blue-chip” firms. Some Nigerian Golden Tele-
coms staff have used the expertise they have developed at the com-
pany to go on to establish or augment dynamic new Nigerian compa-
nies both within and beyond the telecoms sector. For example, a 
Nigerian former Golden Telecoms senior staff member left the com-
pany to join one of Nigeria’s major up-and-coming technology and 
engineering firms in 2009 and was rapidly promoted through its 
ranks. Now the Chief Operating Officer of the company, which has 
grown to employ nearly 200, he attributes his meteoric rise to what he 
learnt at Golden Telecoms. “I think the whole glory goes back to 
where I am coming from”, he contends, “I was well tutored on how 
to run operations and how to do so many things so the glory goes 
back to Golden Telecoms” (Anonymous 22 2010). As Brautigam 
(2003) has suggested in the case of auto-parts manufacturers in 
southeast Nigeria, it would appear that contact with Chinese busi-
nesses can enable African entrepreneurs to develop new skills and 
capabilities and establish spin-off ventures of their own. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the growing Chinese presence in Ghana and Nigeria 
has excited some notable tensions, particularly around the activities of 
Chinese traders and the treatment of local workers. This has led to 
some negative, racialised stereotyping of “the Chinese” and has occa-
sionally been accompanied by apparent threats of violence against 
Chinese people and their investments. However, we have seen that 
narratives of conflict around the Chinese presence are generally much 
more nuanced than this. What are regarded by some local interests as 
negative impacts associated with the activities of Chinese migrant 
entrepreneurs are often seen to be inevitable and not always undesir-
able outcomes of globalisation, little different to the effects of in-
vestments made by local and other international actors. It is also ap-
parent that the tensions that do emerge around the Chinese presence 
tend to not simply pit Chinese actors against African actors but rather 
expose competing African interests (see also Axelsson and Sylvanus 
2010; Dittgen 2010; Scheld 2010). For example, African traders who 
directly import goods from China and have led much of the agitation 
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against Chinese traders have come up against African distributors and 
consumers who do not have such transnational capabilities and have 
come to appreciate Chinese traders as a cheap source of Chinese 
goods. Similarly, government officials often appear to be more inter-
ested in developing diplomatic and economic relationships with Chi-
na than they are in responding to calls by various civil society actors, 
such as trade unions, to more firmly regulate some of the activities of 
Chinese investors (see also Baah, Otoo, and Ampratwurm 2009). In 
such ways, responses to the Chinese presence appear to have as much 
to do with the politics of African societies as they do with the politics 
of China–Africa relations (see also, Mohan and Lampert 2013).  
Furthermore, we have seen that Sino-African encounters can ex-
tend beyond tension and conflict to involve more convivial relations. 
However, it is important not to idealise these convivial encounters, as 
the positionality of local actors is again key. For example, while the 
most senior Nigerian manager in a Chinese factory in Lagos made it 
clear that he is on very friendly terms with his Chinese boss and be-
lieves him to be a kind and generous employer (Anonymous 23 
2010), it has been reported that local manual workers in the same 
factory are paid low wages, do not have contracts and have been 
discouraged from forming a union. Just as Appiah argues that cos-
mopolitanism can be the “warm glow of imperialism” (cited in 
Knowles 2007: 6), there is a danger that apparently convivial relations 
can represent the warm glow of exploitation. It is therefore necessary 
to consider the class alliances involved in such relations. Nonetheless, 
the development of more convivial Sino-African relations is an im-
portant channel through which at least some African actors are able 
to leverage benefits from the Chinese presence. Furthermore, it is 
also clear that local actors can at times exert meaningful resistance to 
aspects of the relationship that run contrary to their interests. While 
the encounters that result may be less convivial, they have rarely be-
come specifically “anti-Chinese” or violent. Any attempts to whip up 
such sentiments would have to overcome both the nuanced way in 
which Sino-African encounters are widely understood and the more 
convivial and mutually beneficial relations that appear to be more 
developed than is often assumed.  
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